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This should be reason enough to provide him with the habeas corpus
remedy to insure that his individual rights are fully protected.
Courts should consider giving a liberal interpretation to the
custody requirement of the Great Writ in recognition of the fact
that the range of modern penal sanctions encompasses many re-
straints on a person's liberty which are more subtle than a plain
physical confinement, yet serve essentially the same functions. The
writ of habeas corpus is not a creature of the legislature, but a
device fashioned by the courts to protect and extend their own
jurisdiction. It should not require legislative reform before it can
become a viable remedy for those citizens who are victims of
illegal restraint. This is particularly true at a time when rapid
expansion of the meaning of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is being made. In this
respect the writ of habeas corpus commands general recognition
as the essential remedy to safeguard a citizen against unjust im-
prisonment by state or federal government in violation of his
constitutional rights.
PEDER ANDERSON
USURY-INTEREST AFTER MATURITY--APPLICABILITY OF USURY STAT-
UTE-Defendant executed and delivered a promissory note to the
Republic Supply Company in August 1962. The note called for repay-
ment of the principal in five installments with interest on each
installment at the rate of seven percent per annum. In the event
of default in any payment of principal or interest, the note specified
interest thereon at the highest legal rate permitted by contract
under state law, but in no event in excess of ten percent per annum,
from the date of default until paid. In February, 1965, when the
entire note was in default, Republic assigned it to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued to collect the note and defendant contended that
the clause in the note which provided for a possible higher rate
after maturity than the lawful rate in North Dakota made the note
usurious. The trial court held that the provision called for greater
interest after maturity than before and was void, and that after
maturity the note drew interest at the legal rate of four percent.
Defendants appealed, specifying as error the trial court's failure
to apply the penalty for usury by forfeiting all of the interest and
one fourth of the principal as provided by Section 47-14-10 of the
North Dakota Century Code. The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the usury statute applied only to interest before maturity
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and any provision in a contract providing for a higher rate after
maturity, regardless of the rate, is void as to the increase and has
no other effect on the contract. Oil Investment, Inc. v. Dallea
Petroleum Corp., 152 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1967).
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the provisions of the
note regarding a higher rate of interest after maturity did not
violate the usury statute, section 47-14-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code,' on the basis of section 47-14-05.2 The section states:
All contracts shall bear the same rate of interest after
maturity as they bear before maturity, and any contract
attempting to make the rate of interest higher after ma-
turity shall be void as to such increase of interest.
The defendant's contention that contracts which specify a higher
than lawful interest rate after maturity should be subject to the
penalties of the usury statute is not persuasive in view of the
explicit language of section 47-14-05. The court concluded, and a
brief study of the relevant statutes confirms, that section 47-14-09
governs the interest rate before maturity and section 47-14-05 governs
interest after maturity. This conclusion is inevitable if both statutes
1. The section provides as follows:
Usury-Definition-Maximum contract rate-Prohibition.- Except as
otherwise provided by the laws of this state, no person, copartnership,
association, or corporation, either directly or indirectly, shall take or re-
ceive, or agree to take or receive, In money, goods, or things in action,
or in any other way,any greater sum or greater value for the loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or things in action than seven per cent per
per annum, and In the computation of interest the same shall not be
compounded. No contract shall provide for the payment of interest on
interest overdue, but this section shall not apply to a contract to pay
interest at a lawful rate on interest that is overdue at the time such
contract is made. Any violation of this section shall be deemed usury.
The civil liability for usury is set forth In section 47-14-10.
If an lnlawful rate Is contracted for but not paid, all of the interest Is forfeited plus
25% of the principal. If the unlawful rate of interest has been paid, the borrower may
(1) recover twice the amount of interest paid plus 25% of the principal, or (2) offset
twice the amount of such interest against any indebtedness which the borrower may owe
the lender.
2. The dictrict court also recognized that the note was not controlled by the usury
statute as to the Interest rate after maturity, but appears to have misconstrued ,
47-14-05. In effect, the note carried the same rate after maturity as before although that
result was probably not intended by the lender. But since the note specified 7% before
maturity, and the highest rate permitted by contract in North Dakota is also 7%, it
is most difficult to determine how the district court fouind a higher rate after maturity.
The district colrt then proceeded to the conclusion that the lender was entitled only
to the legal rate of 4% after maturity, which also appears to contrary to § 47-14-05.
Section 47-14-05 only requires a forfeiture of the difference between the before and after
rate, not the application of the legal rate. The legal rate after maturity would be applied
in a case where the borrower defaulted on a non-interest bearing note. A non-interest
bearing note would thus draw the legal rate after maturity as a measure of com-
pensatory damages for the detention of money. Allen v. Miller, 84 N.W.2d 571 (N.D.
1957).
Where the parties have specifically agreed to an interest rate before maturity, §
47-14-05 applies and Insists on the same rate after maturity, not the legal rate (unless,
of course, the agreed rate before maturity was 4%).
The district court's construction of the note as calling for a higher rate after mat-
urity was not specified as error and the supreme court was unable to discuss the
question. Had the opportunity been presented, there can be little doubt that the district
court's construction would have been set aside.
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are to be given their intended effect, and as the court noted, "[I]f
the Legislature had intended to apply the usury statute to interest
rates after maturity, it would have been a simple matter to so
state, in which event Section 47-14-05 would not have been needed.""
North Dakota, by statute, adheres to the general rule that a
higher than lawful rate after maturity is not usurious.4 The reason-
ing which supports the majority position is based on the premise
that parties contract for the use of money for a definite period. At
maturity, the borrower is bound to pay the principal plus the
agreed upon interest rate. The borrower's obligation is therefore
fixed and his only remedy for a higher than lawful rate applicable
before maturity is the relief given by the usury statute. But if
the borrower is contractually subjected to a higher than lawful rate
after maturity, he can avoid the unlawful rate by promptly paying
the obligation at maturity. The majority rationale seems to be
founded on the philosophy that the law should not help those who
do not help themselves.
The minority jurisdictions, including South Dakota, 5  take a
pragmatic attitude toward interest rates and make no distinction
between before and after rates. The usury penalty is applied when-
ever a higher than lawful rate is contracted for in order to give
debtors the complete protection of the statute. In many instances
the debtor may be unable to pay his debt at maturity and thereby
avoid the higher than lawful rate. Hence, it is just as onerous to
require the debtor to pay the rate after maturity as before when
circumstances are such that prompt payment is impossible.,
Both views have an inflexible quality which somewhat detracts
3. Oil Investment, Inc. v. Dallea Petroleum Corp., 152 N.W.2d 415, 419 (N.D. 1967).
4. E.g., Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. (4 Pet) 205 (1830) ; Easton v. Butterfield Live
Stock Co., 48 Idaho 153, 279 P. 716 (1929) ; and Oil Investment, Inc. v. Dallea Petroleum
Corp., supra note 3.
5. Tennessee and Texas are apparently the only other jurisdictions comprising the
minority. The leading cases in these Jurisdictions are Bang v. Phelps & Bigelow Windmill
Co., 96 Tenn. 361, 34 S.W. 516 (1896), and Parks v. Lubbock, 92 Tex. 635, 51 S.W. 322
(1899).
6. In the case of Ulviden v. Sorken, 58 S.D. 466, 237 N.W. 565, 566 (S.D. 1931),
the South Dakota Supreme Court stated the following:
Requiring the maker of a note to pay a higher rate of interest after
maturity for the use of money is likely to be as oppressive as when re-
quired to pay a higher rate during the term of the loan. It may not be
within the power of the borrower promptly to meet his obligations at
maturity. If a borrower is to be protected from the extortion of an ex-
cessive rate for the use of money, there is no apparent reason why it
should be limited to the term of the loan . . . What difference can It
make In the essence of the transaction that the excessive rate shall be
agreed to be paid for one period rather than another? Is It not equally
the compensation demanded by the lended or the creditor for the use of
his money? We think it Is, most certainly. The fact that the party might
relieve himself from this payment by payment of the bill at the day
agreed upon for Its falling due, only prevents other contracts from being
enforced against him; but If he for any cause failed to pay, then the in-
terest at the rate contracted for becomes due by virtue of the agreement,
Is paid as interest for the continued use of money, and Is contrary to the
requirements of the law.
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from the strength of their reasoning. The majority assumes that
the debtor can always avoid the higher by prompt payment and
views debtors as a financially liquid class. The minority, on the
contrary, holds to the other extreme and assumes that debtors are
never in a position to pay their obligations promptly. Neither po-
sition is, of course, in accord with reality.7 The majority view is
not entirely rigid, however, since if the parties do not act in good
faith and there is an intent to evade the usury laws, the penalty
of the usury statute would apply.s This qualification of the general
rule is useful, but it does not answer the minority's criticism that
even though the contract is entered into in good faith and there
is no intent to evade the usury laws per se, these factors are
little consolation to the debtor who is subject to the unlawful rate
because he was unable to pay his debt at maturity.
The minority urges another basis for its holding which is far
less persuasive. The usury statutes prohibit the taking of excessive
interest. At common law, interest was defined as compensation
for the use or forbearance of money.9 By definition, therefore,
compensation for the detention of money was not considered as
interest, but rather as a penalty for failing to pay at maturity.
The rate thus specified after maturity could not be subject to the
usury laws since interest was not taken, only a penalty.10
The minority asserts, however, that the common law definition
of interest was expanded by statute. In South Dakota, for example,
the statute defines interest as the compensation for the use or for-
bearance or detention of money.:" Therefore, that which was con-
sidered a penalty at common law was made interest by the statute
and a stipulation for an unlawful rate after maturity for the deten-
tion of money was usurious as an unlawful taking of interest.
1 2
On the basis of the statutory definition of interest, it would
appear that North Dakota should align itself with the minority
since the North Dakota Century Code definition is identical with
the South Dakota statute."3 The court in the instant case distinguish-
ed the South Dakota position, however, on the ground that the
7. A middle postion would perhaps be more desirable. Such a postlon might apply
the usury statute to those situations where the debtor satisfactorily proves that he is
unable to meet his obligations at maturity. There would be inherent in this position
such problems as the quantum of proof required, but the difficulties in applying this test
would not be insurmountable. Moreover, this position is one which would allow the
courts to base a decision on the merits of the case rather than a conclusive legal pre-
sumption which has doubtful validity.
8. Oil Investment. Inc. v. Dallea Petroleum Corp., supra note 3, at 419.
9. Parks v. Lubbock, supro note 5, at 323.
10. Id.
11. S.D. CoDE § 38.0103 (1939).
12. Ulviden v. Sorken, supra note 6, at 566.
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-04 (1960) provides as follows: " 'Interest' defined.-
Interest Is the compensation allowed for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money,
or its equivalent."
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South Dakota usury statute was dependent on the word "interest"
whereas the North Dakota statute did not mention interest. 14 More-
over, the court stated that the public policy of North Dakota as
to interest rates after maturity was clearly manifested by section
47-14-05. South Dakota has no similar provision and this fact alone
should suffice as a basis for explaining the opposing views. Interest
is a creature of the statute law,15 and there is nothing to be
gained from attempting to justify differences in individual state
public policy on the basis of nebulous definitional concepts which
amount to little more than legal niceties.1
6
Section 47-14-05 prohibits any increase in the interest rate
after maturity, even though such increase is within the maximum
permitted by law. In effect, the statute sets the limit of compen-
satory damages for the detention of money at the rate charged
before maturity. The reasoning of the statute is found in Allen v.
Miller, where the court stated the following:
• . . the imposition of a higher rate does have a coercive
quality which the law may well frown upon. Such a rate may
be more than compensatory. These considerations no doubt
prompted our Legislature to prohibit increases in the rate
of interest after maturity.6
Generally, a higher but lawful rate after maturity is not con-
sidered penal and will be enforced. 19 This issue is also a matter
14. See the text of the statute, supra note 1. This reasoning appears rather strained,
however, since if one takes, in money, a certain percentage per annum on a loan of
money, the logical term for the sum so taken is interest .
15. Consolidated Police and Fireman's Pension Fund Commission v. Passaic, 23 N.J.
645, 130 A.2d 377, 381 (1957).
16. The weakness of the definitional distinction is emphasized by the fact that Ten-
nessee uses the common law definition of interest but still holds to the minority view.
The court in Bang v. Phelps & Bigelow Windmill Co., supra note 5, apparently con-
sidered the term "forbearance" is including the element of detention. Conversely, the
Texas court, in Parks v. Lubbock, supra note 5 at 323, defined forbearance as excluding
detention and stated "[the forbearance occurs when there is a debt due or to become
due, and the parties agree to extend the time of its payment. The detention of money
arises in a case when a debt has become due, and the debtor withholds its payment,
without a new contract giving him a right to do so."
This definitional morass in the minority jurisdictions indicates the futility of dis-
tinguishing the two positions on the basis of the so-called "common law" meaning of
interest.
17. Supra note 2.
18. Id. at 574.
19. E.g., Greenbaum v. Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 5 Mich. App. 121,
145 N.W.2d 864, 865 (1966); Moffitt-Harrison Builders, Inc. v. Sandman, 177 Neb. 425,
129 N.W.2d 524 (1964) ; and Flynn v. Dick, 13 A.D.2d 756, 215 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
In Western Securities Co. v. Naughton, 124 Neb. 702, 248 N.W. 56, 57 (1933), the
court stated the following:
Where a note provides for a lawful rate of interest from date until
maturity, and a higher and lawful rate of Interest afterwards, the rate
of interest which the note draws from its date to maturity is the con-
tract rate for that time, and the rate which the note draws after mat-
urity is the contract rate from that date.
The Florida decision of Conneticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Fisher, 165 So.2d
182 (Fla.Ct.App. 1964). Involved a situation where the note provided for Interest on
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of local public policy for the legislature to determine, 20 and North
Dakota has chosen to declare that parties to a contract for the loan
of money may not liquidate damages. Implicit in such a policy is
the old notion that money is a commodity basically static in value2"
and damages for its loss of use are highly predictable. It is un-
likely, for example, that a lender making a short term loan
bearing the current money market interest rate could, after matur-
ity, employ such money at a higher rate. Under such circum-
stances, a higher rate after maturity may well be penal.
Minnesota also prohibits any increase in the rate after matur-
ity.22 Although the Minnesota rule has long been established, it has
met with some criticism. The criticism, well founded, is directed
to the rule's restriction on the parties' freedom to contract. As
the court in Talcott v. Marston23 stated:
The reasoning upon which the rule of law has been estab-
lished is entirely unsatisfactory to my own mind, and I think
an agreement of parties, deliberately entered into, and fully
understood, to liquidate the damages on breach of contract
to pay money, ought to be enforced as much as any other
contract. 24
The court apparently had no opportunity to discuss one other
major issue which appears to be raised by the terms of the note.
The note specified that interest at the highest legal rate permitted
by contract was payable in the event of default in any installment
of principal or interest. The borrower was thus required to pay
defaulted payments of principal or interest at the highest rate permitted under Florida
law. The court stated that as to the higher rate on defaulted payments of principal" . . ,
the provision for payment (of the higher rate after maturity] did not infect the trans-
action with usury, as it only designated a different rate of interest to be paid after
maturity than the rate payable for the time prior to maturity." Id. at 184. Moreover,
since Florida law did not prohibit the payment of interest on interest overdue, the after
maturity rate on defaulted payments of interest did not constitute usury. Not only did
the court consider interest on interest overdue as lawful, but also stated the following at
page 184:
The agreement was made upon the faith of a regular and punctual pay-
ment of the interest and the computation of interest upon the interest
supplies the place of prompt payment and indemifies the creditor for
his forbearance. It is founded upon a moral and equitable consideration,
the forbearance and extension of time.
'20. In Re Black Ranches, Inc., 362 F.2d 8,16 (8th Cir. 1966).
21. Consolidated Police and Fireman's Pension Fund Commission v. Passaic, supra
note 15 at 381.
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (1966). The section states the following:
Contracts shall bear the same rate of interest after they become due as
before, and any provision in any contract, note, or instrument providing
for an increase of the rate of interest after maturity, or any increase
therein after making and delivery, shall work a forfeiture of the entire
interest . ..
The penalty for violation of the statute is considerably harsher than that contained
in § 47-14-05 of the North Dakota Century Code which only forfeits, the difference
between the before and after maturity rate.
23. 3 Minn. 389, 3 Gil. 238 (1859).
24. Id. at 244.
424 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
interest on any installment of interest overdue. The usury statute
provides as follows:
No contract shall provide for the payment of interest on
interest overdue, but this section shall not apply to a contract
to pay interest at a lawful rate on interest that is overdue
at the time such contract is made. Any violation of this
section shall be deemed usury.
25
Until 1933, the practice of contracting for interest on interest
which might become overdue in the future was sanctioned by the
usury statute. The Session Laws of 1935 provided for the basic
prohibition and the case of Security Credit Co. v. Wieble,26 decided
in 1937, supplied judicial interpretation which, in 1943, prompted
incorporation of the exception.
27 Minnesota 28 and South Dakota
29
permit the contracting for interest on interest overdue, but our
legislature, prompted perhaps by the economic conditions of the
depression years, chose to declare such contracts usurious as a
matter of public policy. The opinion in the instant case would have
been much more satisfying, and indeed complete, if it had dis-
cussed the issue or at least stated the reason for the lack of dis-
cussion.
In North Dakota, the matter of interest after maturity, at
least on the principal, is regulated by statute as a means of limiting
compensatory damages for the breach of a contract to pay money.
The matter of interest on payments of interest after maturity is
also a matter of statutory regulation, but such a charge is pro-
hibited as usurious. Perhaps there should be no distinction between
the two and whatever policy prompted the legislature to prohibit
the payment of interest on interest overdue has probably been
eroded by prevailing business practices.
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09 (1960).
26. 67 N.D. 407, 272 N.W. 750 (1937).
27. In the Security Credit Co. v. Wieble case, the defendants defaulted on a note in
the amount of $177.15. The note consisted of $130.00 past due principal and $47.15 in-
terest which had accured on the former principal. The plaintiff, rather than collecting
the sum originally due him, consented to a new note which incluled the past due interest
as a part of the new principal. When plantiff attempted to collect this note, the defendants
claimed that the note was usurious by virtue of its charging interest on interest overdue.
The court held that there was no usury and stated:
In 1933 (Chapt. 140), after a lapse of forty-three years, the legislature
reversed the policy which it had adopted in 1890. It changed the law by
changing a few words therein and making it read, 'Any violation of this
Section shall be deemed usury; provided that any contract hereafter
made, to pay interest on interest overdue shall be deemed usury.' It
thus prohibited that which formerly it had permitted to be done, namely,
to contract for the payment of interest on interest which might in the
future become overdue. It did not thereby change the general rule that
such interest could be contracted for on interest after it became past
due. Id. at 751.
The exception to the general prohibition was incorporated into the N.D. Rgv. Coru
§ 47-1409 (1943).
28. MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (1966).
29. Wieland v. Loon, 79 S.D. 608, 116 N.W.2d 391 (1962).
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A strong argument can be made for the permitting of interest
on past due payments of interest by examining the consequences
of a default. After interest has accrued and its payment is due,
the interest is a contract debt and can be collected at law just as
a default in an installment of principal.30 Both are due the lender
by the terms of the contract. As a result, it would seem perfectly
proper to establish a rate of interest after maturity to be applied
to both as a matter of compensatory damages for the wrongful
detention of the sum due. This would not constitute compound in-
terest, which is also prohibited under the usury statute, 31 as long
as the interest after maturity was computed separately as to each
defaulted installment of interest from the date it was due until
paid.3 2 Compound interest only results when interest is added to
the principal and the combined sum is then made to bear additional
interest.3 8
Any change in this area will have to come from the legislature.
Interest and usury are statutory subjects which are dependent upon
current economic conditions for their appropriateness and vitality
of enforcement. A review of these statutes in view of current public
policy by our legislature might reveal a need for change.
BRUCE E. BOHLMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNITED STATES-DESECRATION OF THE
FLAG--Defendant was accused of desecrating the American flag by
the comtemptuous use of the flag in a display at his art gallery.
The display contained thirteen three dimensional objects described
as constructions. One of the objects was an American flag stuffed
in a form suggesting a human body and suspended from a yellow
noose. A second construction was a white cross with a bishop's
mitre on the head piece, the arms wrapped in ecclesiastical flags,
and a flag wrapped phallus made from an American flag. Defendant
contends that this was merely an expression of opposition to church-
condoned aggressive warfare in Vietnam and was protected under
his constitutional right to free speech. Prosecution was brought
under New York Penal Law §1425 subd. 16. HELD; statute pro-
hibiting desecration of American flag does not violate freedom of
speech guarantee. One member dissenting. People v. Radeck, 279
N.Y.S.2d 680, (1967).
30. Security Credit Co. v. Wieble, supra note 26 at 751.
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09 (1960).
32. See Hovey v. Edmlson, 3 Dak. 449, 22 N.W. 594 (1885).
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-36 (1959).
